China tries influencing Taiwan elections with balloons and ships

中國試圖用氣球和船隻影響台灣選舉

China wants to manipulate Taiwanese to vote for its preferred candidate


Is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) inept or clever?

Looking at their attempts to influence the Taiwanese elections one would think the former. Why?

This article will discuss the CCP history of attempted Taiwanese election interference by using military force and grey zone actions. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to conduct itself in this manner with the most recent events involving balloon overflights of Taiwan and Chinese tugboats illegally entering the country’s territorial waters.

Taiwanese recall CCP harassment conducted to protest Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) visit to Cornell University and his election during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The CCP ordered the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fire missiles over and near Taiwan during 1995-6.

Then President Clinton ordered a U.S. Navy helicopter carrier (USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) amphibious assault ship) and carrier (USS Nimitz (CVN-68)) battle groups to pass through the Taiwan Strait and the USS Independence (CV-62) carrier battle group to stand ready to deter PLA aggression. The American response demonstrated U.S. resolve in support of Taiwan and against the CCP’s attempted election interference.

The result of the CCP’s actions? Taiwanese voters picked Lee as their first democratically elected president, not the preferred CCP choice.

In 2020, President Tsai ing-Wen (蔡英文) was doing poorly in the polls prior to her second election. Meanwhile, the CCP decided to renege on its agreement with the U.K. on Hong Kong and imposed a severe crackdown against protesters.

Seeing, reading, and hearing about the brutality and injustice in Hong Kong, Taiwanese voted for the DPP rather than the KMT. The CCP once again helped convince Taiwanese to vote for a candidate not preferred by China.

The CCP again appears to be preparing to bully Taiwan in a way like its efforts in 1995–6 and 2020.

Transparency

Beginning in September 2020, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) decided to publicly report all PLA flights into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and any crossing the Taiwan Strait median line. These reports have helped Taiwan and its allies have a clearer idea of the challenges and threats from China. They have also helped increase support for enhanced defense in Taiwan.

Beginning on Aug. 5, 2022, after then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit, the MND started to inform the public about PLA navy ships in the vicinity of Taiwan. This transparency brought the naval threat into clearer focus for the Taiwanese, and for allies and partners.

In May 2023, I wrote a series of articles about PLA drones encroaching on Taiwan’s airspace or the potential for overflying the country (see here and here). I also noted that the PLA could make the shoot-down of a drone easy or exceedingly difficult depending on speed, altitude, and type of UAV.

Balloons: Civil–Military Fusion

No one should doubt that the CCP uses balloons for civilian and military purposes. In articles I wrote for a U.S. think tank about the CCP balloon overflying U.S. airspace early last year (see here and here), I pointed out that it collected intelligence as it overflew the U.S.

A balloon could also be used to deliver weapons. On Dec. 7, 2023, the MND began announcing the location and time PRC balloons flew into Taiwan’s ADIZ. Below is a set of online MND graphics that show approximately where, at what altitude, and when the balloons flew.

As can be seen by MND reporting, the balloons systematically flew closer to Taiwan’s airspace until, on Jan. 1, one balloon flew over Taiwan and flew near military bases on both coasts (Taichung AFB and Suao Naval Base).

The balloons float dangerously close to the altitudes that commercial jets fly through. These altitudes also make the balloons easily vulnerable to being shot down by the Taiwan Air Force. Given the balloons’ altitudes and flight paths over strategic sites, the PLA appears to be baiting the Taiwan Air Force to intercept them.

The PRC probably flew balloons prior to December 2023 into the ADIZ and possibly even over Taiwan. The MND’s reports of balloons should have given the PRC warning to not fly them over Taiwan’s airspace, especially prior to the elections.

Nevertheless, the PRC decided to send three of their four balloons over Taiwan on Jan. 2. I predict more balloon overflights. The CCP may be trying to assess Taiwan’s ability to intercept balloons, and could send dozens, or perhaps hundreds of them.

What threat do the balloons pose?

In addition to being a hazard to commercial air traffic, PRC balloons float over or near sensitive military sites. For example, on Jan. 2, balloons 1 and 3 flew near Penghu Island where Makung Air Force and Navy bases are located.

They also flew near Chiashan and Hualien AFB on the east coast of Taiwan. Chiashan cost almost US$1 billion (NT$27 billion) and can handle up to 200 aircraft inside the mountain complex, according to press reports.

On Jan. 2, balloon 3 flew close to several military air bases (Kangshan, Tainan, Chiayi AFBs, and Zuoying NAS) in the southern part of Taiwan.

The PRC continued to fly balloons near and over Taiwan. 0n Jan. 4, a PRC balloon flew into the ADIZ. On Jan 5, two PRC balloons flew into the ADIZ and balloon 2 flew over northern Taiwan including overflying near Tamsui and Keelung ports (see below).

Another PRC balloon flew in the ADIZ north of Taiwan on Jan 6. As of Jan. 7-8, the PRC launched three more balloons, two overflying Taiwan (see below). Balloon 1 overflew Taiwan near Hsinchu AFB and Suao Naval Base. Balloon 3 flew near Kaohsiung port and Pingtung AFB.

The PRC might claim that these balloons are just weather balloons—just as they claimed the reconnaissance balloons that flew over the U.S. early last year were weather balloons. This PRC claim, of course, was proven false.

Future PRC balloon flights over Taiwan may be to serve nefarious ends. The balloons might be equipped with sensors to collect signals intelligence, cameras to take pictures and collect imagery intelligence, or other equipment to collect other types of intelligence.

In a worst-case scenario, these balloons could carry bombs, precision guided munitions, or armed UAVs to attack strategic sites nearby. In fact, the Discord leak showed that the U.S. anticipated that the PLA would use a WZ-8 drone launched from a PLAAF H-6 bomber and could also be launched from a balloon, to overfly Taiwan and attack strategic targets.

Invading Taiwan’s territorial waters

The PLA Navy, Chinese Coast Guard, maritime militia, and Chinese commercial ships push the envelope of Taiwan’s territorial waters. For example, two Chinese commercial tugboats were caught twice entering Taiwan’s territorial waters once on Nov. 30, 2023 and on Jan. 2. They came within three-four nautical miles of Taiwan’s coast—a clear violation of sovereignty of twelve nautical miles.

Almost daily, the PLA Navy encroaches on Taiwan’s 24-nautical mile contiguous zone buffer and the Taiwan Navy responds accordingly to push them away from the country. The PLA flights into Taiwan’s ADIZ and across the Taiwan Strait median line activates the Air Force to fly out to stop the incursions.

Some analysts state that the CCP is trying to challenge Taiwan’s independence, exhaust and degrade its military, and assert the CCP’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. I claim that the CCP’s efforts are more expansive: the CCP is conducting psychological and cognitive warfare against Taiwan (and other countries) by signaling that the PLA can conduct aggressive actions without consequences. The CCP’s relentless aggression is designed to make Taiwanese believe that resistance is futile.

Besides challenging Taiwan’s sovereignty, these commercial boats could also be involved in intelligence collection, including underwater mapping of possible invasion beaches, creating a distraction so that PLA submarines can snoop close to the Taiwan coastline even leaving behind intelligence collection systems under the sea, and many other possibilities.

Creating lose-lose political scenarios

With Taiwan’s elections coming up, it is easy to conclude that the PRC conducts political, psychological, and cognitive warfare against Taiwan’s ruling party by using balloons and ships to violate the country’s sovereignty.

The logic of UAV overflights, as demonstrated in my previously cited articles, applies to the PRC’s missions for balloons and ships.

Taiwanese political leadership may be reticent—with good reason—to shoot down a PLA balloon or sink or detain a Chinese commercial ship. A political crisis accompanying such events would increase the likelihood of the KMT winning the 2024 elections. The CCP is trying to place the DPP into a classic lose-lose scenario.

Listed below are apparent options:


Do nothing: If the Taiwanese government does nothing, then the KMT will claim that the DPP is incompetent and cannot protect Taiwan’s national security.
Attempt to destroy or detain: If President Tsai orders the military to destroy the balloons or the Coast Guard to detain the ships, then the KMT will broadcast its campaign slogan of “peace or war” and claim that the DPP is irresponsible and is inciting China to attack Taiwan.
Shoot and miss/unsuccessful attempt to detain: If Taiwan’s military attempts and fails to shoot down the balloons, the PLA can continue to fly balloons over Taiwan to reinforce the idea that they can conduct these flights with impunity, and the KMT will claim DPP incompetence. The same applies to the PRC ship incursions into Taiwan’s territorial waters.


The Taiwanese government should continue to immunize the population against CCP psychological and cognitive warfare by recourse to transparency against these lose-lose scenarios. The first step of this strategy is to educate the population about the balloon overflights and the PRC commercial shipping incursions that ignore Taiwan’s claim for its territorial waters before these no-win scenarios have been set in motion.

I am extremely glad that the Taiwanese government chose to inform the public about balloon overflights. I believe that the government will respond appropriately to the aggression, continue to prepare the population, enhance national defense, and work with other countries to deter CCP expansionist aggression.

China’s belligerence against the democratic country of Taiwan will strengthen the Taiwanese population’s resolve to resist the CCP’s dangerous authoritarian rule.

Let us see if the CCP’s blatant sea and air territorial violations will affect Taiwan’s voting for the CCP’s preferred party. The CCP, luckily, stumbles down the path of ineptness and insanity, in which they believe they can manipulate to their advantage a democratic country’s citizens. The Taiwanese people should—and will—decide their own fate!



Guermantes Lailari is a retired USAF Foreign Area Officer specializing in the Middle East and Europe as well as counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and missile defense. He has studied, worked, and served in the Middle East and North Africa for over 14 years, and similarly in Europe for six years. He was a US Air Force Attache in the Middle East, served in Iraq and holds advanced degrees in International Relations and Strategic Intelligence. After retiring from the USAF, he worked in a variety of positions, including four years for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC) Irregular Warfare Technology Support Directorate. He was selected to be a program manager for the Asymmetric Warfare Program at the Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, followed by assignments in the Middle East where he managed a US forward-based missile defense radar and a variety of other technical positions. He was selected to be a 2022 Taiwan Fellow by the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is now a visiting scholar in 2023-2024 at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan.